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1. Summary 
The most recent global progress report on the effectiveness of development cooperation found 
that fewer than half of participating countries have quality mutual accountability mechanisms in 
place; those that do are significantly more likely to be countries that are more dependent on 
Official Development Assistance (ODA). However, ODA is only one type of support: the growing 
number and diversity of funding sources and the general ambition of the 2030 Agenda1 are 
increasing the complexity of development cooperation and the frameworks needed to manage it. 
At the same time, political interest in aid effectiveness principles, including mutual accountability, 
appears to be waning. Efforts to apply the principle of mutual accountability have tended to 
founder on the challenge of dealing with its political realities and the persistent asymmetries in 
power – the very reason why the principle was adopted in the first place. 
Mutual accountability mechanisms between donors and recipient governments generally 
comprise a number of common elements: a policy framework that articulates shared goals; 
mutually agreed targets and systems for monitoring progress towards them; structures that 
facilitate regular policy dialogue and review at both political and technical levels; and the 
publication and dissemination of results and findings. The nature and configuration of these 
elements will vary by country, as will the capacity to establish, manage, and implement them. 
The report describes a selection of accountability mechanisms and processes in common use, 
including joint results frameworks, joint sector reviews, and information management systems, 
and the lessons from applying them. Some common findings emerge: 
 Effective monitoring and accountability frameworks depend on sufficient data 
management capacity being in place at national and lower levels of government, but 
this is often lacking. 
 The process of policy dialogue requires careful attention: for example, finding the 
right balance between breadth of participation and quality of debate, or ensuring 
sufficient space for genuine dialogue and negotiation rather than simply information-
sharing. 
 Strategic-level policy dialogue can strengthen accountability by focusing 
collective attention on higher-level development outcomes, for example by 
encompassing a number of sectors, or by being explicitly linked to national planning and 
reporting frameworks. 
 Sector-based reviews have maximum effect when properly embedded in the 
mainstream planning, budgeting, and reporting system. 
 Processes of joint review and reporting should address technical and financial 
issues in tandem, such as sector reports that cover programme expenditure, or the 
tracking and monitoring of development cooperation that records actual expenditure and 
results, or the participation of finance ministries in review meetings. 
The report highlights the potential of regional-level accountability mechanisms, particularly for 
peer review and learning. It concludes with short case studies of the mutual accountability 
framework designed for the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme, which 
                                                   
1 https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld  
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operates at national, regional, and continental levels, and of the compacts used by the New Deal 
for Engagement in Fragile States. Both of these apply some of the processes and mechanisms 
discussed earlier in the report. 
The literature on aid effectiveness and development cooperation is extensive, although there are 
challenges in finding up-to-date information on the precise mechanisms in use in different 
countries. The literature reviewed for this report gives little specific attention to gender or people 
with disabilities. For example, global monitoring reports provide data on agreed gender 
indicators, such as allocations for gender equality and women’s empowerment, but there is less 
cross-referencing between the different dimensions of the monitoring framework. 
2. Mutual accountability 
A series of high-level aid effectiveness meetings (Rome, 2003; Paris, 2005; Accra, 2008 and 
Busan, 2011) endorsed the principles that should govern the relationship between donors and 
recipient governments. One of the five Paris principles was mutual accountability, reflecting a 
concern that donor-recipient relationships were inherently uneven (OECD, 2008). By the time of 
the Busan agreement, the principles had reduced to four and the scope of accountability had 
broadened to include domestic constituencies: 
Transparency and accountability to each other. Mutual accountability and accountability 
to the intended beneficiaries of our co-operation, as well as to our respective citizens, 
organisations, constituents and shareholders, is critical to delivering results. Transparent 
practices form the basis for enhanced accountability.2 
Some authors perceive declining momentum on aid effectiveness since Busan (Lundsgaarde 
and Engberg-Pedersen, 2019). The latest Reality of Aid report (IBON International, 2018) notes 
few recent initiatives to strengthen democratic national ownership, expand inclusive partnerships, 
or respect developing country policy space. McKee et al (2020) attribute the waning political 
interest in aid effectiveness to several factors, including the emergence of other global priorities, 
domestic political challenges in donor countries, and the more complex financing requirements 
for the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). This is despite evidence that the application of 
development effectiveness principles, when done well, leads to better development results 
(Benfield & Como, 2018). Jones (2017) suggests that ‘collective and interlinked accountability’ 
might more accurately reflect the needs of the 2030 Agenda. 
An evaluation of the Paris Declaration found that of its five principles, mutual accountability was 
one of two that had advanced the least (Wood et al, 2011). A number of studies suggest that 
mutual accountability has foundered on a failure to deal with the political realities. A case study of 
mutual accountability in Mozambique found that power asymmetries persist; performance 
assessment of both government and development partners functioned at a technical level but the 
underlying political dynamics were unchanged (SADEV, 2012). Leiderer (2015) concluded that 
the main impediment to applying aid effectiveness principles in the health and education sectors 
in Zambia was the failure to deal with political economy challenges, such as collective action 
problems among donors. Sullivan (2017), writing about multiple accountabilities in Tanzania’s 
                                                   
2 Paragraph 11d: https://www.oecd.org/development/effectiveness/busanpartnership.htm  
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health sector, comments that transparency and accountability enable development actors to 
present an appearance of legitimacy while concealing practices that undermine those principles. 
3. National-level mutual accountability mechanisms 
The Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) was established in the 
wake of Busan to improve development effectiveness. Its latest biennial monitoring report 
(OECD/UNDP, 2019) found the following: 
 Fewer than half of participating countries have quality mutual accountability mechanisms 
in place. ‘Quality’ in this context is defined as having in place four of the five components 
described in Box 1. 
 Countries with greater dependence on ODA are significantly more likely to have quality 
mutual accountability mechanisms in place. 
 Mutual accountability mechanisms are evolving in response to the changing context for 
development cooperation, particularly in countries less dependent on development 
assistance. Here, governments are adjusting accountability mechanisms to incorporate 
the growing diversity of funding sources; for example, there may no longer be a single 
aid coordination unit, but rather responsibility for different types of resources may be 
spread across government (Global Partnership, 2020). However, governments are not 
necessarily setting targets for the performance of these new partners as they do for 
traditional bilateral and multilateral partners. Platforms for public-private dialogue are 
increasingly common (such as BUILD in Bangladesh).3 
The precise nature and configuration of the processes and mechanisms for mutual accountability 
will vary in each country, as will the capacity to implement them. 
                                                   
3 The GPEDC has also developed the Kampala Principles for effective private sector engagement in 
development cooperation: https://www.effectivecooperation.org/content/kampala-principles-effective-private-
sector-engagement-through-development-co-operation  
Box 1: Five components of mutual accountability 
1. Policy framework for development cooperation. This may be either a separate 
document or embedded in a national development strategy. 
2. Country-level targets for effective development cooperation. These should be clear, 
specific, measurable, and time-bound. Target-setting creates incentives for strategic 
dialogue, partnership, and cooperation. 
3. Regular assessments of progress that hold stakeholders accountable for their 
commitments against the targets. 
4. Inclusive assessments of progress that create space for multi-stakeholder dialogue 
between a range of development partners. 
5. Timely and publicly available results. Transparency is a pre-condition for building trust 
and can generate domestic pressure for continuous improvement. 
Source: OECD/UNDP, 2019 
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Rwanda is an example of strong national ownership and capacity. An early adopter of aid 
effectiveness principles, its approach is described as ‘instrumental (Keijzer et al, 2019), in that it 
systematically scrutinises whether a development cooperation activity will help realise its own 
development strategy. The processes and mechanisms it uses include the following (Keijzer et 
al, 2019; Benfield & Como, 2018; Hasselskog et al, 2017): 
 An aid policy approved in 2006, one year after the Paris Declaration. 
 A manual of procedures to guide implementation of the policy, published in 2011. 
 Mechanisms for mutual accountability and dialogue, including the Development 
Partners Coordination Group (DPCG) and sector working groups. The latter are chaired 
by a ministry official and co-chaired by a development representative determined by the 
Rwandan government. 
 Donor Performance Assessment Framework, which evaluates donor performance 
against a number of development effectiveness indicators.4  
 Division of labour policy, whereby development partners are restricted to no more than 
three sectors based on their comparative advantage. Benfield and Como (2018) find that 
this led to greater focus, higher impacts, and lower administration costs, and freed up the 
time of civil servants. The literature also suggests that it led to more focused and 
effective policy dialogue in the sector working groups (Global Partnership, 2020). 
 Development assistance database. Donors update this online, and the government 
then uses indicators from this to score their performance using a traffic light system. 
The rest of this section discusses a selection of commonly used processes and mechanisms that 
can enhance mutual accountability: (i) joint programming and joint results frameworks; (ii) joint 
sector reviews; and (iii) information management systems. It concludes with some general 
reflections on policy dialogue. 
Joint programming and joint results frameworks 
Joint programming is a particular feature of European Union cooperation, and refers to the joint 
planning of development cooperation by EU members in a partner country. The process has 
three stages: a roadmap, which describes the objectives for dialogue and how agreement will be 
built; a process of joint analysis, which builds common understanding of the issues to be 
addressed and how this will be done; and a joint response, which describes how support will be 
provided and progress measured, the division of labour between partners, and indicative 
financial commitments. The detail of specific projects is not included in the document: rather, joint 
programming provides a ‘strategic umbrella’ to bilateral programme documents (ADE, 2017, p.4). 
An evaluation of EU joint programming in 14 countries between 2011 and 2015 (ADE, 2017) 
found that the approach is worthwhile and starting to deliver positive results, although so far 
mostly limited to the EU family rather than partner countries. However, it highlighted two 
examples of practice with strong potential to improve policy dialogue and development 
effectiveness: 
                                                   
4 This was inspired by a similar process in Mozambique. Until 2012, Rwanda also used a complementary 
Common Performance Assessment Framework, which was a common results matrix of selected poverty 
reduction outcome indicators that formed the basis for negotiating budget support. 
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 Strategic groupings of sectors: policy dialogue is organised around ‘clusters’ in 
Ethiopia and ‘pillars’ in Palestine, bringing together three-to-five sectors with similar 
concerns or objectives, or where a common approach seems sensible. This helps 
stakeholders collaborate across administrative and institutional boundaries, given the 
often fragmented manner in which public policies are designed and implemented. The 
evaluation suggests that this approach could be helpful given the emphasis on policy 
coherence and cross-sector integration in the 2030 Agenda. 
 Joint results frameworks in Cambodia and Palestine are used not only to monitor 
policy implementation but as vehicles for high-level policy dialogue between the 
government and the EU extended family.5 The evaluation found that these joint results 
frameworks focus donor and government attention on the outcomes of policy 
implementation and thus contribute to transparency and accountability. 
The Busan agreement identified country-led results frameworks as a common tool to assess 
performance (OECD, 2011); for example, EU partners in Laos use a joint results framework 
linked to monitoring indicators in the National Socio-Economic Development Plan (European 
Commission, 2017). However, the mechanism has challenges: first, the need to rank and 
prioritise results in order to avoid long lists of indicators, which can be helped by a well-designed 
process of joint analysis; and second, finding the right balance between results that are 
aspirational but also achievable and can be monitored. The use of joint results frameworks can 
expose gaps in country statistical and monitoring systems which it is suggested are also better 
addressed jointly and comprehensively rather than bilaterally (European Commission, 2017). 
Joint sector reviews 
Joint sector reviews (JSRs) have their origins in the sector-wide approach but are now being 
used in a wider range of contexts (Danert, 2016). Lattanzio, Irving and Salgado (2017) 
investigated their impact on mutual accountability and the domestic policy cycle through a 
literature review of JSRs in education, health and agriculture and a more detailed study of 
education JSRs, thought to be the first systematic assessment of them to date. 
Across all stakeholder groups, accountability was identified as the second most important 
outcome of a JSR, after country ownership. Lattanzio et al (2017) found no agreed definition or 
standardised set of practices that constitute a JSR but proposed five dimensions that are likely to 
make it an effective platform for mutual accountability: 
(i) Participatory and inclusive. ‘Inclusion’ refers to who is involved, and ‘participation’ 
to the quality of their contribution and engagement. The study highlighted a tension 
between the representation of all stakeholders on the one hand and the quality of 
sector dialogue on the other. It also noted higher attendance by other sector 
ministries than by ministries of finance. 
(ii) Aligned to shared policy frameworks. This may be a sector plan, or other agreed 
policy framework. The study found a significant disconnect between the content of 
the document and what was actually discussed during a JSR, suggesting that the 
agreed policy framework is not actually driving the discussion and holding 
stakeholders accountable. 
                                                   
5 The collaboration also included Norway and Switzerland. 
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(iii) Based on evidence. Study informants emphasised the capacity challenges 
associated with the collection and analysis of robust data, as well as the tension 
between owning the report and producing a quality output. More than two-thirds of 
annual implementation reports on JSRs did not cover programme expenditure. 
Another weakness was evidence on follow-up of previous recommendations. 
(iv) Monitoring tool. This should include a learning function, whereby implementation 
shortcomings identified through monitoring are then exploited for the lessons they 
offer about how to improve. 
(v) Instrument for change embedded effectively into a policy cycle. The study found 
that the link between JSR recommendations and policy change was weak, largely 
because the JSRs were poorly anchored in sector planning and budgeting exercises. 
The authors suggest that timing is crucial, and that JSRs need to be embedded in the 
appropriate phase of the policy cycle. A further challenge concerns the production of 
the JSR report which in some cases generates political tension and reveals divergent 
stakeholder interests that have not been addressed. The authors recommend giving 
more attention to the political economy of drafting the JSR aide-memoire. 
A similar multi-country review – again, the first of its kind – looked at the experience of JSRs in 
the water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) sector in 19 countries between 2001 and 2015 and 
reached similar conclusions (Danert, 2016): 
 The contribution of JSRs to mutual accountability can be demonstrated in only a few 
countries, but the mechanism has potential, continues to evolve, and should be 
encouraged. ‘At their best, JSR processes provide a reliable overview of finance, 
implementation, institutions, and gaps; bring sector stakeholders together; and contribute 
towards driving reforms and improving sector governance. At their worst, there is hurried 
preparation for a poorly facilitated gathering that identifies a plethora of problems and 
priorities for action that fail to be implemented or followed-up on. Most JSR processes fall 
somewhere in between the above extremes’ (Danert, 2016, ii). 
 In countries where multiple donors are financing WASH and not providing general budget 
support, JSRs are one of the few mechanisms that can bring about mutual accountability 
at country level. 
 Publication of sector performance is essential for accountability. However, online JSR 
documentation was only available for seven out of the 19 countries where JSRs took 
place and was only consistently published on government websites in four of these 
(Burkina Faso, Liberia, Nepal, and Uganda). The data, presentation, and referencing of 
JSR reports needs more rigour. 
 JSRs will only have wider impact, including as a mutual accountability mechanism, if they 
are an integral part of the national (or devolved) planning and reporting process rather 
than separate to it. Finance and planning ministries need to be involved alongside the 
technical actors. 
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The study concludes with a set of 16 considerations for strengthening both the JSR process and 
the WASH sector.6 
Some partners are working to improve the quality of sector dialogue and accountability. For 
example, the Global Partnership for Education facilitates Local Education Groups, led by 
government, that bring together a more inclusive group of actors than might normally participate 
in sector discussions, such as teachers’ associations, civil society organisations and 
philanthropists.7 These groups provide inputs throughout the education planning cycle, from 
analysis to evaluation (Benfield & Como, 2018). 
Information management systems 
Mutual accountability requires transparency about activities and achievements, both from 
government and from development partners. Data needs to be credible, accessible, and 
disaggregated, for example in terms of gender, age, or location, in order to track who is 
benefiting and who is being left behind. Accessibility can be strengthened by the use of open 
formats for digital data, or by disseminating information about government spending through 
multiple media such as local newspapers (Myanmar), village noticeboards (Indonesia), or free 
budget hotlines (Uganda) (Benfield & Como, 2018). 
Almost all partner countries participating in the most recent Global Partnership monitoring 
process use one or more information management systems to collect data on development 
cooperation.8 However, only 60 percent of these include information on final expenditure and on 
results (OECD/UNDP, 2019). There are widespread challenges in collecting high-quality and 
timely data, and in tracking the increasing variety of sources of development cooperation (Global 
Partnership, 2020). 
A study of mutual accountability in Mozambique highlighted the importance of presenting 
parliament and donors with the same documents to assess, thus avoiding parallel structures of 
accountability. The Ministry of Planning and Development also developed leaflets and pamphlets 
to provide parliament with easily digestible information on the performance assessment 
framework (SADEV, 2012). While parliamentary scrutiny is key to domestic accountability, the 
proportion of development cooperation subject to parliamentary scrutiny has declined globally 
since 2016, possibly because less is being disbursed through the public sector (Global 
Partnership, 2020). 
Policy dialogue 
Peebles et al (2015) evaluate policy dialogue as an instrument of development cooperation using 
the example of Sweden’s work on gender equality. While there is no clear consensus on its 
definition, the study proposed that, in the context of development cooperation, policy dialogue is 
based on a discussion of values that then determines how donor, government, and civil society 
                                                   
6 A similar list of recommendations, with suggestions for good practice, have been made by WaterAid: 
https://washmatters.wateraid.org/sites/g/files/jkxoof256/files/strengthening-joint-sector-reviews-in-the-water-
sanitation-and-hygiene-sector-learning-synthesis-note.pdf  
7 https://www.globalpartnership.org/what-we-do/education-sector-planning  
8 Examples of these include: https://opendevelopmentcambodia.net/; http://www.odamoz.org.mz/ 
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resources are allocated. Dialogue may be formal or informal – the first being particularly effective 
when visibility or influence on policy development or reform is required, and the second when 
following-up commitments, building common understanding, or discussing the support required. 
The study identified challenges associated with the monitoring and measurement of policy 
dialogue, and found that successful policy dialogue tends to have the following characteristics: 
 Clear policy objectives and values. 
 Coordinated with, and supported by, complementary processes, such as policy-related 
research or the strengthening of civil society participation in policy dialogue. 
 Leadership of ambassadors and heads of cooperation. 
 Broad-based and meaningful stakeholder participation. 
The nature and quality of policy dialogue can be affected by the choice of aid modality. Policy 
dialogue is particularly strong with budget support, the modality that encompasses all the Paris 
principles (Benfield & Como, 2018). However, budget support is declining, particularly among 
bilateral donors (IBON International, 2018). A study of the exit from budget support in Malawi, 
Rwanda, Uganda and Zambia found that it weakened policy dialogue, particularly at a political 
level, and led to greater fragmentation of the aid portfolio and the loss of a framework for 
accountability (Orth et al, 2018). 
4. Regional-level mutual accountability mechanisms 
In their discussion of accountability for the 2030 Agenda, Elgin-Cossart and Chandran (2016) 
examine five existing global and regional mechanisms. They identify two ways in which these 
can enhance SDG implementation: (i) through inspiration, by identifying champions, sharing 
success stories, supporting collective action, and using the positive power of reputation; and (ii) 
through evidence-based learning, which can deepen understanding of what works and drive 
adaptation and policy reform, but requires high-quality analysis based on robust standards. 
The authors identify six general characteristics of effective accountability mechanisms: 
i. Clear objectives: mechanisms should specify what they hope to achieve and how. 
ii. Form linked to function: the structure of a mechanism should reflect its objectives. 
iii. Robust incentives, which drive change and encourage substantive participation. 
iv. Better balance between substance and process (the former is currently weaker). 
v. A range of stakeholders, which tends to improve substantive engagement. 
vi. Use of champions to drive learning, inspire change, and influence policy. 
Jones (2017) agrees that the regional level could be an important vehicle for peer review of the 
2030 Agenda and to exchange good practice. However, he cautions that the further 
accountability moves from the national level, the more this risks trade-offs in democratic 
accountability. 
One of the five accountability mechanisms reviewed by Elgin-Cossart and Chandran is the 
African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), established by the African Union (AU) in 2003 as a 
voluntary self-monitoring mechanism. The authors describe the APRM as innovative and well-
designed, but in practice facing technical challenges and a recent loss of political attention. The 
main lessons from the APRM process are that: 
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 Peer reviews must have a clear subject and a reasonable timeframe. More focused 
reviews, carried out less frequently, might improve their technical quality and credibility. 
 Inadequate resources undermine reviews as well as the mechanism itself. Under-
resourced secretariats lead to poor reviews, which in turn lead to a loss of confidence in 
the mechanism and a loss of high-level political engagement. 
 Civil society engagement requires adequate resourcing and care to ensure that it 
adds value. 
5. Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development 
Programme 
The Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) began in 2003 and 
was reinforced by the 2014 Malabo Declaration, which confirmed agriculture as a key continental 
priority and committed AU member states to ‘a systematic regular review process’.9 CAADP’s 
mutual accountability framework was designed in 2011 around three core elements: (i) a shared 
agenda and shared objectives that bring all partners together and provide the basis for 
cooperative action; (ii) performance information based on mutually agreed performance 
criteria; (iii) a process of genuine dialogue and debate based on mutual consent, common 
values and trust. Since CAADP is a non-binding agreement, the objective of the accountability 
framework is to incentivise partners to deliver on their commitments (Oruko et al, 2011). 
At the national level, the principal components of CAADP’s accountability framework are the 
following (AU Commission, 2020; Global Donor Platform for Rural Development, 2018): 
 National CAADP Compact, which commits the country to the CAADP process and may 
be signed by numerous stakeholders.10 
 National Agricultural Investment Plans (NAIPs),11 that should (i) be embedded in 
country planning and budgeting systems and aligned with the Medium Term Expenditure 
Framework; (ii) provide a foundation for resource mobilisation and utilisation; (iii) facilitate 
private sector engagement; (iv) mainstream gender concerns, including a gender budget 
statement; and (iv) be subject to regular monitoring and review. The second generation 
of NAIPs reportedly has a stronger focus on private sector engagement through the 
integration of Country Agribusiness Partnership Frameworks. 
 Joint Sector Reviews, which combine elements of monitoring and evaluation, policy and 
institutional review, public expenditure review, and accountability. They should be 
participatory mechanisms to assess performance, verify stakeholder commitments, and 
promote stronger policies. 
This planning and review process is then mirrored at the level of the Regional Economic 
Communities (RECs). ECOWAS was the first REC to hold its regional JSR in June 2016 (AGRA, 
                                                   
9 Malabo Declaration, Article VII. https://www.nepad.org/caadp/publication/malabo-declaration-accelerated-
agricultural-growth  
10 For example, Ghana’s Compact was signed by two government ministers as well as representatives of the 
African Union, the World Bank, civil society, agricultural associations, and the private sector. 
11 Sometimes National Agricultural and Food Security Investment Plans. 
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2018). At the continental level, a system of biennial reviews began in 2017, followed by a second 
in 2019 (AU Commission, 2020). 
The CAADP process receives technical support from a Regional Strategic Analysis and 
Knowledge Support System (ReSAKSS), organised in three regional hubs. National hubs are 
also being established: a common challenge is limited country capacity in the data and 
knowledge management needed to support the monitoring and mutual accountability systems 
(AU Commission, 2020). The various tools used include the CAADP Results Framework for 
2015-2025 and (for the biennial review) the Africa Agriculture Transformation Scorecard.12 
Progress is published online.13 
The principal governance mechanisms for CAADP include the following (GDPRD, 2018): 
 CAADP Partnership Platform, which is an annual multi-stakeholder forum to share 
information and review progress.14 
 Development Partners Coordination Group (DPCG), which provides a platform for 
donors and technical agencies to coordinate and align their support. A multi-donor trust 
fund operated until 2016, since when the importance of the DPCG for coordinating 
assistance has increased.  
 National Agricultural Sector Working Groups, which bring development partners and 
national representatives together to coordinate their work. 
 CAADP Africa Forum and Non-State Actors Coalition, both of which aim to expand 
engagement particularly by non-state actors. 
The literature contains some reflections on CAADP’s mutual accountability process: 
 Nhemachena et al (2017) found that the JSR process helped strengthen mutual 
accountability efforts in four countries in Southern Africa,15 but that there is still 
fragmentation of policies and programmes and capacity challenges in monitoring and 
evaluation, especially at lower levels of government. 
 An independent assessment of CAADP’s multi-donor trust fund concluded that the JSR 
process is promising and that JSRs are key to mutual accountability in CAADP, but that 
there are capacity challenges as well as difficulties in guaranteeing credible and binding 
commitments by governments and donors (ECDPM, 2014). 
 The biennial review process currently focuses on reporting by AU member states and AU 
institutions, but could give more emphasis to accountability by a wider range of partners, 
including the private sector and civil society organisations (AU Commission, 2020). 
                                                   
12 The African Union uses scorecards for other sectors and initiatives, such as gender, malaria, water and 
sanitation, and domestic financing of health.  
13 https://www.nepad.org/caadp/tracking-progress  
14 One observation on this platform is that its congested agenda can compromise stakeholder participation and 
the quality of debate, and that space needs to be found for dialogue and negotiation, not just reporting (Oruko et 
al, 2011). 
15 Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland (Eswatini), and Zambia. 
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 The inaugural biennial reviews relied on country self-assessments and not all were 
subject to multi-stakeholder validation. A credible process will require stronger statistical 
systems to ensure the accuracy of data (centred around the main statistical agency, not 
just the agriculture ministry), adequate time for the process, and the engagement of non-
state actors throughout (AGRA, 2018). 
6. Mutual accountability in fragile and conflict-affected 
states 
The New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States was launched at the Busan meeting in 2011 and 
reflected ‘the mutual commitment of national and international partners to country-owned and 
country-led exits from fragility’ (Hearn, 2016, p. 9). The basis for dialogue between national and 
external partners are five peacebuilding and state-building goals. Two sets of principles guide 
implementation, characterised by the acronyms ‘FOCUS’ (which emphasise working politically 
towards unified country-owned objectives), and ‘TRUST’ (aid effectiveness for state-building) 
(Hearn, 2016). 
The main accountability mechanism for the New Deal is the country compact. This is an 
agreement between a government and its international partners, based on consultations with 
national stakeholders, that defines joint priorities and targets and ways to manage risk (Locke & 
Wyeth, 2012). Compacts are intended to be light, with four elements: (i) a limited set of priorities; 
(ii) a transparent overview of funding sources and flows; (iii) a strategy for how to finance agreed 
priorities; and (iv) a monitoring framework to facilitate accountability for results.16 However, the 
experience of compacts in multiple countries is that their obligations fall largely on governments, 
with less concrete accountability demonstrated by partners (Manuel et al, 2017). 
Somalia 
Until 2016 the Somalia New Deal Compact provided a framework for prioritisation, sequencing, 
aid effectiveness and coordination between government and development partners. The principal 
governance mechanism that coordinated aid around the Compact was the Somalia Development 
and Reconstruction Facility (SDRF), which is still in place. The Compact was designed around 
the New Deal’s five goals, with a government-donor working group for each goal that involved 
multiple ministries and international partners (Hearn, 2016). A review found that while the mutual 
accountability framework helped to build trust between the government and its partners, the 
degree of commitment to it on both sides was unclear (Manuel et al, 2017). 
After a political transition the Compact was succeeded by the New Partnership for Somalia which 
reiterated the commitment to mutual accountability. An initial mutual accountability framework 
was agreed in 2017 and has since passed through two iterations. This document is both focused 
and broader: focused, in that it identifies a limited set of commitments for both the government 
and its international partners that reflects their priorities for that year and complements the more 
comprehensive monitoring associated with the national development plan; broader, in that it is 
now a single accountability framework for work on inclusive politics, security and justice, 
                                                   
16 https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/file/10270/download?token=jbJ55FYj  
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economic development, and social development.17 An online Aid Information Management 
System, managed by the Ministry of Planning, Investment and Economic Development, was 
launched in April 2020 to track and report on aid flows.18 Its design sought to keep reporting 
simple, limiting the number of fields to be collected and easing the process of data entry and 
verification (Global Partnership, 2020). 
The SDRF continues to govern the partnership between the government and the international 
community. It functions as both a coordination and financing framework in that it brings together 
three multi-partner trust funds under common governance arrangements in support of the 
national development plan (Federal Government of Somalia, 2019). 
Sierra Leone 
Sierra Leone has been at the forefront of the New Deal, given its leadership role in the G7+ 
group of countries affected by conflict. In 2014 it developed a mutual accountability framework 
explicitly based on New Deal principles and focused on delivering the country’s national 
development plan (‘Agenda for Prosperity’). The Framework uses a dashboard to track progress 
against indicators associated with the Paris Principles and Busan, Agenda for Prosperity, and all 
five of the New Deal’s peacebuilding and state-building goals (Hearn, 2016). Coordination and 
dialogue take place in quarterly meetings between government and development partners, with 
civil society representatives in attendance (Hart et al, 2015). 
  
                                                   
17 https://www.daljir.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/4_5807420474300302642.pdf  
18 https://aims.mop.gov.so/  
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